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OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
to improve the leasehold than can one who furnishes labor, or one whose
materials are consumed in the improvements. The statute should be held to
protect professional services, for without them no wells can be drilled.
Michael L. Tinney
Oil and Gas: Surface Damages, Operators, and the
Oil and Gas Attorney
On July 1, 1982, House Bill No. 1460 became Oklahoma law.' The essence
of the Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act (the Act) is to provide for
surface damages to be paid by the oil and gas operator2 to the surface owner.
These damages are to compensate the surface owner for harm to the surface
resulting from drilling and production operations. While receiving little notorie-
ty, the Act's passage reflects a dramatic change in the legal relationship between
mineral and surface owners. In addition, by placing restrictions and affir-
mative duties on the oil and gas operator, the law has a profound impact
upon the daily oil and gas operations within the state. The purpose of this
note is to examine the terms of the Act and to analyze both its legal and
practical significance.
Prior Law
To understand the significance of the Act, it is first necessary to become
familiar with the legal principles that served to define the relationship between
mineral and surface owners prior to the Act. It has long been established
common law in Oklahoma and, indeed, throughout the nation that a mineral
owner has, where not expressly granted, the incidental or implied right to
enter, possess, and use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to
develop the mineral interest.3 The rationale underlying the common law is
that where an interest has been granted, all incidental rights that are essential
or reasonably necessary to obtain full beneficial use and enjoyment of the
interest must be implied, absent language expressing a contrary intent."
1. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1062-66 (codified
as 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 313.2-318.9 (Supp. 1982). Section 10 of the Act makes its provisions effective
as of July 1, 1982.
2. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, § 1, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1062
(codified as 52 Orit,. STAT. § 318.2 (Supp. 1982) defines operator as either a mineral owner
or a lessee.
3. Sanders v. Davis, 79 Okla. 253, 256, 192 P. 694, 697 (1920). Some early cases held such
a right was not implied where not expressly granted, e.g., Newbern v. Gould, 162 Okla. 82,
19 P.2d 157 (1933). Tfiese cases were overruled very early in favor of the rule as stated. Melton
v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1940). For application of this principle in other states,
see, e.g., 38 AM. JvIR. Gas and Oil § 115, nn. 13, 14.
4. Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 391, 109 P.2d 509, 512 (1940).
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The common law approach merely recognizes that to allow a grant of mineral
rights without a corresponding grant of at least some portion of the surface
for the production of the minerals would be ridiculous.5 Thus, prior to the
Act and in the absence of an expressed contrary intent, upon conveyance of
a mineral interest the grantee received the implied right to make such use
of the surface as to enable him to enjoy the purpose of his estate. This im-
plied right included the privilege of ingress and egress across the surface' and
the right to use and occupy so much of the surface as was necessary for the
purpose of exploring and developing the mineral interest.7
Of course, before a conflict can arise the mineral and surface interests must
be severed. There is no question as to surface use or damages where the sur-
face owner is also the mineral owner. However, under the common law once
the interests were severed the mineral owner had the implied right to make
use of the surface, and this was true regardless of whether the severance was
by lease,8 grant, or reservation.9
In Oklahoma this common law right of the mineral owner to use the sur-
face has rightfully been characterized by the courts as an easement, specifically
an easement in gross."' Under Oklahoma statutory law, I2 an easement creates
5. Ferguson & Jones, A New Approach to the Use of the Surface Estate by a Lessee Under
An Oil and Gas Lease, 13 S. Tax. L.J. 269, 273 (1972).
6. Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 391, 109 P.2d 509, 512 (1940). See also Davon Drilling
Co. v. Ginder, 467 P.2d 470, 472 (Okla. 1970).
7. Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 207, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918). See also Sanders v. Davis,
79 Okla. 253, 255, 192 P. 694, 697 (1920).
8. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Dunivant, 183 Okla. 233, 80 P.2d 225, 226 (1938).
9. Burns v. Bastien, 174 Okla. 40, 44, 50 P.2d 377, 382 (1935). The court recognized the
implied right to enter the surface whether the mineral ownership was derived by grant or by
reservation.
10. Hinds v. Phillips Pet. Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1979).
11. Id. However, in Hinds the court was considering the easement with respect to an oil
and gas lease, concluding the easement was in gross under 60 OKLA. STAT. § 50(6) (1981). The
rationale was that the right to remove minerals given by a lease is a profit a' prendre which
is an interest in realty, but not a per se real estate. As such there was no "estate" for the ease-
ment to be appurtenant and therefore it was deemed a personal easement or an easement in
gross. Having found such, the court was quick to add that the easement is freely assignable
and inheritable under both statutory and common law. Id., citing 41 OKLA. STAT. § 10, and
Stanton v. T.L. Herbert & Sons, 141 Tenn. 440, 211 S.W. 353 (1919). This rationale is in keep-
ing with the Oklahoma common law theory that minerals in the ground cannot be owned as
such, but that mineral conveyances merely give the grantee an incorporeal interest, a right to
explore, produce, and reduce the minerals to possession, Ellis v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.,
450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1978), aff'd 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S.
964 (1980). This is true whether the conveyance is by lease, 591 P.2d 697, or by grant or reserva-
tion, 450 F. Supp. 412. However, except for the technical distinctions caused by the nonowner-
ship of minerals in place theory, the mineral owner's right to use the surface can be considered
equivalent to an easement appurtenant under 60 OKLA. STAT. § 49(6) (1981) since the easement
is freely alienable, see 28 C.J.S. Easements §46 (1974), and in view of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's definition of appurtenant in Catterall v. Pullis, 137 Okla. 86, 89, 278 P. 292, 294 (1929)
(where the court held appurtenant means that which is necessary for the use and enjoyment
of the thing granted).
12. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 51 (1981).
19831
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both a dominant and a servient tenement.'3 The dominant tenement is the
interest to which the easement is annexed,'" and the servient tenement is the
interest burdened by the easement."5 Thus, under the common law approach
the mineral interest is the dominant tenement and the surface interest is the
servient tenement, and the courts have so held.'
6
Under the common law the mineral owner had the right to use the surface,
and this right was not conditioned upon compensation to the surface owner
for any damages caused by such use. ' The mineral owner simply was not
required to pay surface damages for the use and, often, the destruction of
the surface. However, the issue arose as to whether this right was unlimited,
that is, could the mineral owner use the surface in a cavalier manner without
regard to the consequences to the surface? Phrased differently, having created
a dominant and a servient estate, how dominant was the dominant estate?
Both the statutory'" and the judicial response" was that this right was limited.
Section 662820 of the Oklahoma Revised Law, 1910, provided that the extent
of an easement, absent specific provisions otherwise, was to be determined
by the nature of tfie enjoyment of the interest for which the easement was
acquired. The statute provided, by implication, that easement rights are
restricted to those uses necessary to the enjoyment of the purpose of the
underlying estate. The courts, without specifically relying on the statutory pro-
visions, arrived at a similar result.
2'
The courts have long held that mineral owners may use the surface only
to the extent such use is reasonably necessary to enjoy the mineral estate.2 2
13. For a dominant and a servient tenement to exist it requires two interests in real estate;
therefore, technically the easement must be appurtenant before a dominant and a servient tene-
ment could be created. However, see note 16 infra.
14. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 436 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
15. Id. at 1228.
16. Wellsville Oil Co. v. Garver, 206 Okla. 181, 183, 242 P.2d 151, 154 (1952). The court
held that a mineral lessee's right to surface use is dominant over a subsequent agricultural lessee's
right to surface use. The court apparently disregarded the technical distinctions of the nonowner-
ship of minerals in place theory when it held, quoting from its decision in Mid-Continent Pet.
Co. v. Rhodes, 205 Okla. 651, 240 P.2d 95, 96 (1951), "[wlhen the mineral rights in land have
been reserved prior to the lease of the lands for agricultural purposes, the holder of an oil mining
lease owns a dominant estate in the land. . . ." Again, technically there cannot exist a dominant
and a servient estate in such a situation since, in Oklahoma, a mineral interest is not a true
estate in the land and therefore cannot be a dominant estate. Yet, for all practical purposes,
the mineral interest can be thought of and referred to as the dominant estate and the surface
as the servient estate.
17. See Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 301 P.2d 686, 688 (Okla. 1956), cited in Cities Serv.
Oil Co. v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Okla. 1958).
18. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 51 (1981). See also 52 OKLA. STAT. § 296 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Pulaski Oil Co. v. Conner, 62 Okla. 211, 214, 162 P. 464, 466 (1916).
20. 1910 Okla. Rev. Laws § 6628, the identically phrased predecessor of 60 OKLA. STAT.
§ 51 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Pulaski Oil Co. v. Conner, 62 Okla. 211, 214, 162 P. 464, 466 (1916).
22. Sanders v. Davis, 79 Okla. 253, 256, 192 P. 694, 697 (1920).
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Accordingly, the mineral owner's surface use has been restricted to activities
reasonably necessary23 for mineral exploration and development.2 ' This has
been stated as the duty of the mineral owner to protect the surface against
uses not reasonably necessary for mineral operations."3 Thus, the mineral owner
was liable for surface damages to the extent surface use was for purposes
unassociated with mineral exploration or development or to the extent the
use was not reasonably necessary.
No hard and fast rule developed as to how much of the surface could be
occupied by the mineral owner as a reasonably necessary use. However, the
-courts did hold that reasonably necessary use is to be judged in relation to
what an experienced operator would do under similar circumstances, having
due regard for both the mineral and surface owners' rights.26 Statutory
provisions may also be helpful in determining what is a reasonably necessary
use.27 In addition to liability for unreasonable and unnecessary use, the courts
have held that mineral owners are liable for surface damages resulting from
wanton or negligent operations.
28
Summary of Prior Law
Under the common law the mineral owner has the right to enter, use, and
possess the surface in order to explore and develop the mineral estate.9 This
right is implied, in the absence of express provisions otherwise, in order to
allow the mineral owner to develop his estate. However, the right to use the
surface is not unlimited. The mineral owner is restricted to use of the surface
for the purposes of mineral exploration and development and can use only
so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for such purposes.30 The
mineral owner is liable for surface damages to the extent surface use is un-
necessary or unreasonable for the purposes of mineral exploration or
development."' Finally, the mineral owner is liable under the common law
for unnecessary surface damages resulting from negligent or willful destruc-
tion of the surface.
3 2
23. Id., 192 P. at 697.
24. Id.
25. Pulaski Oil Co. v. Conner, 62 Okla. 211, 214, 162 P. 464, 466 (1916).
26. Brimmer v. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1936). For an excellent discussion
of activities held to be reasonable by the Oklahoma courts, see Lambert, Surface Rights and
the Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKxA. L. Rv. 373 (1958).
27. See, e.g., 52 OKu.A. STAT. § 296 (1981). For an application of this statute, see Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Dunivant, 183 Okla. 233, 80 P.2d 225 (1938).
28. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035 (Okla. 1958); Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson,
301 P.2d 686 (Okla. 1956).
29. Sanders v. Davis, 79 Okla. 253, 192 P. 694 (1920).
30. Id. at 256, 192 P. at 697.
31. Id.




Legal Significance of the Act:
How the New Law Changes the Old
To understand the legal significance of the Act it is also necessary to examine
the substantive provisions of the Act. A comparison of these provisions with
the common law approach will quickly illustrate the dramatic change that
the new law represents insofar as it redefines the legal relationship between
mineral and surface owners. The provisions that reflect substantive changes
in the law can be found in three sections of the Act.
The pertinent language of section 2 of the Act provides:
Before entering upon a site for oil or gas drilling ... the operator
shall give to the surface owner a written notice of his intent to
drill containing a designation of the proposed location and the ap-
proximate date that the operator proposes to commence drilling
... . Within five (5) days of the date of delivery or service of
the notice of intent to drill, it shall be the duty of the operator
and the surface owner to enter into good faith negotiations to deter-
mine surface damages.33
The effect of this section is to prohibit the oil and gas operator3' from enter-
ing upon the surface for drilling purposes without first notifying the surface
owner of his intent to drill and promptly beginning negotiations to establish
surface damages.
The substantive portion of section 3 of the Act provides:
(A). Every operator doing business in this state shall file a
corporate surety bond or letter of credit from a banking institu-
tion with the Secretary of State in the sum of Twenty-five Thousand
Dollars ($25,000) conditioned upon compliance with . . . this act
for payment of any location damages due which the operator cannot
otherwise pay ....
(C). Upon deposit of the bond or letter of credit, the operator
then shall be permitted entry upon the property and shall be per-
mitted to commence drilling a well in accordance with the terms
and conditions of any lease or other existing contractual or lawful
right.
3s
This section prohibits entry by the oil and gas operator upon the surface until
the requisite bond to secure payment of surface damages is filed.
Finally, section 4(A) of the Act requires that, "[p]rior to entering the site
33. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, § 2, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1063
(codified as 52 OKuL. STAT. § 318.3 (Supp. 1982)).
34. Section 1 of the Act, (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.2 (Supp. 1982)), defines "operator"
as either a mineral owner or a lessee.
35. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, § 3, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1063
(codified as 52 OKLa. STAT. § 318.4 (Supp. 1982)).
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with heavy equipment, the operator shall negotiate with the surface owner
for the payment of any damages which may be caused by the drilling opera-
tion. If the parties agree, and a written contract is signed, the operator may
enter the site to drill."13 6 This section requires the operator to execute a written
agreement with the surface owner as to liability for surface damages before
any substantial drilling operations may be commenced.
Combining the provisions of the three preceding sections, there are three
prerequisites under the Act with which the operator must comply before he
may commence any substantial drilling operations on the surface. These prere-
quisites are: (1) posting bond or letter of credit (section 3), (2) giving the
surface owner notice of an intent to drill and negotiating surface damages
(section 2), and (3) executing a written contractual agreement with the surface
owner as to surface damages (section 4). Section 8 of the Act provides that
the remedy for failure to comply with any of these prerequisites is treble
damages against the operator."
Comparing these three prerequisites with the common law approach reveals
the legal significance of the Act. Under the Act, contrary to the prior com-
mon law, the operator no longer has the implied or incidental right to enter
and use the surface for the purpose of mineral development. No longer does
the operator have the implied right to use and occupy so much of the surface
as is reasonably necessary to develop his estate. Instead, the Act requires that
the operator separately bargain and pay for these rights of surface use. The
Act prevents a purchaser for value of a mineral interest from enjoying the
interest without again compensating the selling surface owner for such right.
The Act allows the existence of a mineral interest without the corresponding
right to enjoy the interest. As such, the Act allows the anomalous situation
the common law approach sought to prevent-a situation that has been
characterized as ridiculous.3 8 Thus, with the stroke of a pen, three-quarters
of a century of common law was displaced. This is the truly dramatic effect
of the Act.
Constitutional Implications
By depriving the operator of important rights recognized under the common
law, questions arise as to the constitutionality of the Act, both in its prospective
and its retroactive application. These constitutional questions include: whether
the Act amounts to an impairment of contractual rights under article 1, section
10 of the United States Constitution;39 whether the Act allows the taking of
36. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, § 4, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1063
(codified as 52 OxuA. STAT. § 318.5 (Supp. 1982)).
37. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, § 8, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1065
(codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 1982)).
38. Ferguson & Jones, supra note 5. See also Note, Oil and Gas: Legislative Damage to
Surface Rights, in this issue.




property without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution;0 and whether the Act is a valid exercise of
the state's police power.
In relation to the constitutionality of a retroactive application of the Act,
section 6 of the Act provides, "[n]othing herein shall be construed to impair
existing contractual rights nor shall it prohibit parties from contracting to
establish correlative rights on the subject matter contained in this act.""
Assuming for the moment the constitutionality of the Act insofar as its pro-
spective application, where the parties have made express contracts regarding
surface use or damages, there is no question about the retroactive application
of the Act or its constitutionality. Section 6 prevents impairment of existing
contract rights and the operator may enter and use the surface in accordance
with the contract, even where surface entrance and use occurs subsequent o
the Act's effective date.
Section 6 is the only provision of the Act that places a limitation on its
retroactive application. However, section 6 limits retroactive application only
where there were "existing contractual rights" prior to the Act. The question
remains, therefore, as to whether the Act is retroactively applicable to situa-
tions where the severance of the mineral interest occurred prior to the Act
but where the parties made no express contract regarding surface use or
damages. Are such mineral owners subject to the terms of the Act and would
retroactive application of the Act be unconstitutional? The answers to these
questions depend on the nature of the mineral owner's common law right
to use the surface.
Perhaps the strongest constitutional challenge to the retroactive application
of the Act is that such an application would impair contractual rights in viola-
tion of article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution. Of course, to
sustain such a challenge it is first necessary to establish that a contractual
right exists. In the situation where the mineral interest was severed prior to
the Act but where no express contractual provisions as to surface use or
damages were made, a contractual right exists only if the common law created
an implied contractual right in the mineral owner to use the surface. This
depends upon whether the common law right of surface use was implied in
fact or in law by the courts.
A right implied in fact is considered to be resulting from the intention of
the parties"' and is implied in order to effectuate the full intended purpose
of the contract.4 When a right is implied in fact the underlying rationale
is that the parties contemplated the problem and intended the result created
by the implied right in order to effectuate the purpose of their contract. The
40. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, § 6, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1065
(codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.7 (Supp. 1982)).
42. BLACK's LAW DICTioNARY 699 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), defining "in fact."
43. See R. HEMNGWAY, OIL AND GAS § 8.1 at 366 (1971), referencing implied covenants
in oil and gas leases.
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right is therefore implied in the contract.44 Thus, if the mineral owner's com-
mon law right of surface use is implied in fact, then the right is implied in
the mineral conveyance. Under this approach every owner of a mineral in-
terest severed prior to the effective date of the Act would be protected against
any retroactive application of it. These owners would hold a "preexisting con-
tractual right" under section 6 of the Act that would bar retroactive
application.
A right implied in law results from situations where the contracting parties
did not provide for nor contemplate the problem at issue, but nonetheless
some remedy is necessary to equitably resolve the problem. The right is not
implied as an incident of the contract s but rather as a remedy apart from
the contract. Under the implied-in-law approach, the owner of a mineral
interest severed prior to the Act, where no express contractual provisions for
surface use or damages were made, would not have a section 6 claim to bar
retroactive application of the Act. This is because the claimed common law
right to surface use would not be considered a preexisting contractual right
under section 6 of the Act, but rather would be considered a remedy fashioned
at law.
There apparently is no clear answer on whether the common law right to
surface use is implied in fact or in law. Some writers have suggested that
the right is implied in law."' However, from a practical standpoint, the right
should be considered implied in fact. It is unlikely that the parties to a mineral
interest conveyance would not anticipate the need for the future surface use.
How could the parties escape the thought that the purchaser would one day
want to enjoy his newly acquired mineral interest and that to do so would
require surface use? Assuming parties do contemplate this problem, the
common law right should be considered as implied in fact.
Closely analogous to the issue of whether the common law right of surface
use is implied in fact or in law is the issue of whether implied convenants
in oil and gas leases are implied in fact or in law. These implied convenants,
like the common law right of surface use, are designed to cover problems
that arise because the parties failed to make express provisions. Reputable
authority exists suggesting that such covenants are implied in law."7 This
position is strengthened by the fact that the courts seldom inquire into the
actual intent or contemplation of the parties in implied covenant cases. Never-
theless, the majority of authorities,"' including the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 9
have held that implied covenants are implied in fact. As such they constitute
part of the lease.5 0
44. Id. at 367.
45. Id.
46. Ferguson & Jones, supra note 5, at 272.
47. R. HEMINGWAY, OIL AND GAS § 8.1 at 367 (1971).
48. Id.
49. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Okla. 46, 50, 120 P.2d 349,
354 (1941).




Because of the similarity between implied covenants in leases and the
common law right of surface use, the authorities holding that implied covenants
in leases are implied in fact should be applicable to the common law right
of surface use. Again, the effect of finding the common law right as being
implied in fact is to establish a preexisting contract right under section 6 of
the Act.
One final aspect involving the retroactive application of the Act as violative
of the "contract clause" of the Constitution must be addressed. The United
States Supreme Court has never held that the "contract clause" is an inflexible
barrier to all legislative regulation which might affect contracts." This is
especially true where the affected contractual right does not represent a sub-
stantial right to either party.52 Moreover, the Court has held that the con-
stitutional ban on impairment of contract rights does not prohibit legislative
changes involving rights that are essentially only remedial in nature.3 The
Court has recognized that the distinction between rights which are substantial
and those which are remedial is often obscure at best.54 This seems amply
true in the case of the common law right to surface use. On the one hand,
the right appears to be only a remedy to a problem for which the parties
failed to provide adequately in their contract. On the other hand, the implied
right of surface use is so important for the mineral owner to iealize the benefit
of his bargain that it should be classified as a substantial right. This analysis
assumes that a contract right actually exists that requires a finding that the
common law right of surface use is implied in fact.
Another plausible constitutional challenge to any retroactive application of
the Act is that to do so would amount to a taking of a property right without
due process and without compensation under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. Any challenge on this basis assumes
that those persons who acquired severed mineral interests prior to the effec-
tive date of the Act have a vested property right to surface use by virtue of
the common law. This challenge is most appropriately considered in connection
with another constitutional challenge: Whether the Act is constitutional in
its prospective application, or more broadly, whether the Act is constitutional
at all. These challenges are underlaid by the same constitutional questions.
It has long been established that states may constitutionally regulate the
production of oil and gas as a valid exercise of their police power .5 The reason-
ing is that the public has a valid interest in the conservation of precious natural
resources from waste or unnecessary depletion5 6 in protecting the correlative
51. G. GuNTHER, CoNsTrmmoNAL LAw 566 (10th ed. 1980).
52. See Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (I How.) 311, 315 (1843).
53. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 154 (1819).
54. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935).
55. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 203 Okla. 35, 220 P.2d 279 (1950),
aff'd 340 U.S. 179 (1951); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
56. Kansas Corp. Comm'n v. Wall, 113 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1940); Champlin Ref. Co.
v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 51 F.2d 823, 826 (W.D. Okla. 1931), modified 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
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rights of co-owners of a common source of supply," and in protecting the
public from the hazards brought about by oil and gas operations and
industrialization.8 This regulation has also been held not to be an improper
taking of vested property rights even where a common law right was taken."
As several Texas courts have held, present legal rules create no vested rights
in oil and gas operations because all operations are subject to police power
and the state may change the legal rules at any time.
6
1
However, the police power is not quite as broad as might be inferred from
the Texas decisions, "[o]therwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no
efficacy and the legislatures of the states would have unbounded power.'",
The underlying notion in the Texas cases, however, was that a valid public
interest existed for which the state could exercise its police power. Indeed,
this is the test by which to measure the constitutionality of all state exercises
of police power, that is, whether an important and legitimate public interest
exists.6 12 Therefore, the basic question as to the Act's constitutionality is whether
there is a valid public interest underlying the Oklahoma legislature's passage
of the Act. This requires an inspection into the various possible purposes of
the Act.
The Act does not pretend to be an environmental protection law. It does
not regulate surface use in the public interest by preventing destructive use
of surface resources that might result in environmental pollution or other health
hazards. The Act merely provides that the operator must compensate the sur-
face owner for such destructive uses. Perhaps the most logical and persuasive
rationale supporting the contention that the Act protects a valid public in-
terest is that the Act serves to protect unwary or unwitting surface owners
from those mineral owners who might use the common law as a means to
take advantage of them. An unscrupulous mineral owner could misrepresent
intended surface use and thereafter use the common law right of surface use
as a vehicle to run roughshod over the surface owner. This, of course, is
not an unpersuasive argument. Surely few would disparage the Securities Acts
for protecting the unsophisticated investor on similar grounds.63 Yet, though
this argument provides support for the existence of a valid public interest,
at the same time it provides the constitutional weakness of the Act.
57. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,
182 Okla. 155, 160, 77 P.2d 83, 89'(1938).
58. Ex parte Biggs, 58 Okla. Crim. 43, 47, 54 P.2d 404, 406 (1935).
59. Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil & Producing Co., 16 F.2d 639, 642 (N.D. Tex. 1926),
aff'd 22 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 585 (1928); Arkansas Fuel Oil Co.
v. Reprimo Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
60. Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil & Producing Co., 16 F.2d 639, 642 (N.D. Tex. 1926),
aff'd 22 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 585 (1928); Arkansas Fuel Oil Co.
v. Reprimo Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
61. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
62. Id., although the degree of judicial scrutiny may change, see, e.g., United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where the Court applied a more deferential attitude toward
the legislative determination of public interests needing protection.




Despite the arguments suggesting the Act protects an otherwise valid public
interest, it regulates what is essentially private conduct. Before the Act, con-
tracts between surface and mineral owners were considered to be arm's-length
transactions with each party bargaining for his own economic advantage. The
right to surface use was but one of the economic benefits bargained for by
the parties. In the absence of an express provision for surface damages, the
contract price included the right of surface use to the mineral owner. This
was by virtue of the common law, which recognized that, by conveying the
mineral interest, the parties intended that the mineral owner be able to enjoy
his newly acquired interest. That surface owners were aware of their economic
interests and the effect of the common law is evidenced by the fact that most
modern leases contain express surface damage clauses." This suggests that
surface owners do not need the special legislative protection of the Act.
Disregarding this consideration, the Act remains a regulation of private con-
tracting that is rarely a matter of legitimate public interest."' If this is truly
the case, there is strong support for the proposition that the Act is unconstitu-
tional, both in its prospective and retroactive application.
A final word is necessary as to whether any retroactive application of the
Act violates the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,"6 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional as applied
a Pennsylvania statute7 that prohibited certain methods of coal mining without
compensation for resulting damages to the surface owners." In Mahon the
statute was applied retroactively with the effect that the plaintiff was deprived
of property and contract rights existing prior to the effective date of the
statute.9 It was admitted, therefore, that the statute destroyed previously
64. See Marland Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 168 Okla. 518, 519, 34 P.2d 278, 279 (1934), where
the court recognized that most modem leases include surface damage provisions.
65. But see Bandini Pet. Co. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 123, 128, 293 P. 899, 901
(1930), where the court upheld a conservation statute. The court considered the statute as a
regulation and adjustment of the correlative rights of surface owners (as against wasteful venting
of gas by mineral owners) and held that it is the coexistence of these opposing rights that authorizes
the state to make use of its legislative power. The court held that "lw]hen the rights of one
impinge upon the rights of others the state may interpose for the purpose of adjusting and regulating
the enjoyment of these rights." This case can perhaps be distinguished since other constitutional
grounds for the state's exercise of police power existed.
66. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
67. Act of May 27, 1921, No. 445, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198-1200, repealed by Act of June 28,
1947, No. 472, 1947 Pa. Laws 1095-1103.
68. The pertinent part of the statute in Mahon prohibited coal strip mining in such a manner
as to remove the support for any dwellings used for human habitation.
69. In Mahon, the petitioner, prior to passage of the statute, conveyed certain property but
reserved the right to remove all coal underlying the property. The grantee took subject to this
right and expressly waived all claims for damages that might arise from the mining out of the
coal. After passage of the Act the grantee sought and was granted an injunction to prevent
the coal mining that was eroding the support for his house. This was a retroactive application
of the statute. The statute in Mahon did not contain an express provision limiting its retroactive
application as does the Oklahoma Act (§ 6).
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existing rights of property and contract." The question presented was whether
this was a constitutional exercise of the state's police power.
The Court in Mahon held that governmental protection of private property
necessarily presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but that the fifth
and fourteenth amendments provide that such property shall not be taken
without just compensation.1 Despite this, the Court recognized that the fifth
amendment does not require government to compensate property owners every
time a change in the law affects property values. In other words, some prop-
erty rights are enjoyed under the implied limitation that they are subject to
change by the exercise of the state's police power. However, the Court also
recognized that at some point the government's diminution of property value
amounts to a taking.7 2 The test, said the Court, is the magnitude of the
diminution.
With this perspective, the Court held the statute unconstitutional, stating:
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking .... In general it is not plain that a man's misfortunes
or necessities will justify his shifting his damages to his neighbor's
shoulders.
73
The Court went on to say:
The question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes
desired should fall. So far as private persons . . . have seen fit
to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see
that the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the giving
to them greater rights than they bought,74
and "[v]e are in a danger of forgetting that a strong desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.""3
The similarity between the statute in Mahon and the Oklahoma Act on
surface damages is striking. Insofar as its retroactive application, the Mahon
statute prohibited certain conduct previously permitted unless compensation
to the surface owner was made. The Court in Mahon recognized the mineral
owner's preexisting property rights as well as his contractual rights and held
that retroactive application of the statute served to deprive the mineral owner
of these rights.76 Because no compensation was provided the mineral owner
70. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
71. Id. at 415.
72. Id. at 413. But see Justice Brandeis' dissent at 417, arguing when private property use
threatens to harm public welfare, regulation without compensation is appropriate.
73. Id. at 415-16.
74. Id. at 416.
75. Id.
76. It is unclear in Mahon whether the property rights the Court referred to were created
by the contract or by the common law right to surface use.
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for this deprivation or taking, the retroactive application of the statute violated
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Further, the Court in Mahon questioned
the public interests underlying such a regulation of private interests."
Under Mahon, any retroactive application of the Oklahoma Act would also
deprive mineral owners of preexisting property rights as implied under
Oklahoma common law. Because the Act makes no provision for compensation
for this taking, under the Mahon doctrine, it violates the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. As Mahon suggests, even if protecting private property interests
is a valid public interest justifying an exercise of the police power, this pro-
tection does not justify shifting the cost of damages retroactively from the
surface owner to the mineral owner. This seems especially true where the parties
did not see fit to so shift these costs. This is the basis of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments challenge to any retroactive application of the Act.
Procedural Provisions and Practical Implications
As noted earlier, the provisions reflecting substantive changes in the law
can be found in sections 2 through 4 of the Act. The procedural provisions
are found throughout the Act. However, this note will analyze only those
provisions that present questions or problems of special interest. The practical
implications for both the operator and the oil and gas attorney will be noted
where relevant.
Section 1 of the Act is the definitions section."' In this section, for the
purposes of the Act, the term "operator" is used to mean mineral owners
or lessees who are engaged in drilling or preparing to drill for oil or gas.
The term "surface owner" is used to mean the owner or owners of record
of the property on which the drilling operation is to occur.
As mentioned previously, section 3 of the Act requires that every operator
doing business in Oklahoma file a corporate surety bond or letter of credit
from a banking institution in the sum of $25,000 with the Secretary of State. 9
This bond or letter of credit is to secure payment of location damages that
might become due and which the operator would otherwise be unable to pay.
In addition, a certificate by the bonding company or banking institution must
be filed in the court clerk's office in each county where the operator is drilling
or is planning to drill. This certificate shall acknowledge the effective status
of the bond or letter of credit. Subparagraph C of section 3 provides that
upon filing of the bond or letter of credit, the operator may then enter upon
the property and can "commence drilling of a well in accordance with the
terms and conditions of any lease or other existing contractual or lawful right."
One problem with section 3 involves its constitutional validity. If the bond
requirement is applied retroactively as to leases or other -mineral interests
created prior to the Act, important constitutional questions arise. The most
77. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
78. Oil and Gas Drilling Surface Damages Act, ch. 341, § 1, 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws 1062
(codified as 52 Oicat. STAT. § 318.2 (Supp. 1982)).
79. Id. § 3 at 1063 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.4 (Supp. 1982)).
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serious question involves mineral interests created prior to the Act where
specific provisions for surface damages are contained in the contract between
the parties. Is the bond filing requirement of section 3 applicable to such
mineral owners?
Section 6 of the Act provides that it shall not be construed as to impair
existing contract rights or as to prohibit contracting to establish correlative
rights on surface damages.0 Yet section 3 makes no exception for operators
with preexisting contractual arrangements as to surface damages. Rather, sub-
paragraph A of section 3 provides, "[elvery operator doing business in this
state shall file a corporate surety bond or letter of credit . . . ." If this provi-
sion is indeed meant to apply to "every operator," without distinguishing
as to those with valid preexisting contract rights, there is perhaps a legitimate
claim that this bond filing requirement violates the "contract clause" of article
I, section 10 of the United States Constitution, at least as to those operators
with preexisting contract rights. There should be no justification for requiring
such operators to post a bond as security for payment of surface damages
where the parties, in contracting to establish the surface damage provisions,
did not see fit to require any security for payment. To now require such
operators to post bond amounts to an impairment of contract rights which
preexist the Act. This argument applies with equal force to those mineral in-
terests created prior to the Act but where no express surface damage provisions
were made if it is argued that the common law right of surface use is implied
in fact.
It is also unclear whether parties, in conveying mineral interests subsequent
to the Act, can contractually dispense with the bond filing requirement. Again,
section 6 provides that the Act shall not prohibit contracting to establish cor-
relative rights as to surface damages. However, section 3 of the Act apparently
is intended to require the posting of bond regardless of any contractual pro-
visions to the contrary.- Subparagraph C of section 3 recognizes that parties
may contractually provide for surface damages and provides that such
operators shall be permitted entry upon the property to commence drilling
in accordance with lease or other contract provisions, conditioned, however,
upon deposit of a bond or letter of credit. Evidently the bond is required
irrespective of any contract provisions which would seek to dispense with its
filing.
Section 3 requires bonding of every oil and gas operator desiring to drill
in Oklahoma. Accordingly, the oil and gas attorney should advise all operator
clients about the bonding requirement to accommodate their compliance with
the Act. As to operators with preexisting contract provisions for surface
damages, the attorney should at least bring the constitutional issues to the
clients' attention. However, section 8 of the Act provides, "any operator who
willingly or knowingly fails to keep posted the required bond ... shall pay,
at the discretion of the court, treble damages."'" In light of this provision,
80. Id. § 6 at 1065 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.7 (Supp. 1982)).
81. Id. § 8 at 1065 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 1982)).
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operator clients should be advised to fulfill the bonding requirement before
maintaining any constitutional challenge.
Section 3 provides that the operator may, upon posting bond for surface
damages, enter the property to drill in accordance with the terms of any lease
or other contract or lawful rights. This, however, is not necessarily the case.
Section 2 of the Act provides that, "[b]efore entering upon a site.., the operator
shall give to the surface owner a written notice of his intent to drill. .... 1
This notice shall contain a designation of the location and the approximate
date that the operator proposes to commence drilling. Thus it would appear
that all operators must give notice of their intent to drill notwithstanding the
fact that their contractual arrangements with the surface owner do not require
such notice. This interpretation is reinforced by the provisions of section 8 which
provide that, "[a]ny operator who willfully or knowingly . . . fails to notify
the surface owner, prior to entering . . . shall pay ... treble damages to the
surface owner.""3
If this requirement of notice is to be applied retroactively to situations where,
in creating the mineral interest prior to the Act, the parties made provision
for surface damages but did not see fit to require notice of intent to drill,
constitutional questions similar to those discussed with the bond filing re-
quirement arise. Imposing this notice obligation upon the operator in such
a situation, although it may be a trivial imposition, is an impairment of a
preexisting contract right. While the terms of section 6 provide that the Act
shall not impair preexisting contract rights, there appears no limitation in sec-
tion 2 restricting the notice requirement to a prospective application.
Even as to the prospective application of the notice requirement, problems
may arise. Again, section 3 allows the operator, upon posting of bond, to
enter and drill in accordance with the lease or contract. It would seem incon-
sistent with this provision to require section 2 notice of intent to drill where
the parties, in post-Act contracting for surface damages, did not see fit to
require such notice. In addition, to require notice in such situations serves
no useful purpose and is an inconvenience to the operator.
The better interpretation of section 2 is that notice of intent to drill is re-
quired only where the parties have not otherwise negotiated for or agreed
upon surface damages. Support for this interpretation comes from the section
2 requirement that, within five days of the delivery or service of the notice
of intent to drill, the operator and surface owner enter into good faith nego-
tiations to determine surface damages. This provision of section 2 has no ap-
plication where the parties have already agreed upon surface damages. In
addition, section 6 provides that the Act shall not prohibit contracting to
establish correlative rights as to surface damages and this should include
provisions dispensing with notice. Thus, section 2, including the notice of
intent to drill, was probably not intended to apply where the parties have
contractually established surface damages prior to entry.
82. Id. § 2 at 1062 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.3 (Supp. 1982)).
83. Id. § 8 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 1982)).
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The provisions of section 2 are ambiguous relating to notice of intent to
drill. Nevertheless, in light of the provision in section 8 allowing treble damages
for failure to give notice of intent to drill, the prudent operator should suffer
the inconvenience of giving notice, even where his lease does not require such
notice.
As noted before, section 2 requires the operator and surface owner, within
five days of delivery of notice, to enter into negotiations to determine surface
damages. Section 2 allows entry upon the property once notice of intent to
drill has been given to the surface owner. However, the nature of such entry
must be limited because section 4 provides that, "[p]rior to entering the site
with heavy equipment, the operator shall negotiate with the surface owner
for the payment of any damages which may be caused by the drilling opera-
tion. If the parties agree, and a written contract is signed, the operator may
enter the site to drill." 8 Therefore, entry under section 2 will permit only
limited operations such as surveying in preparation for drilling. Any other
preparation activity, such as clearing ground with earthmovers, must wait until
an agreement on surface damages is reached.
Section 4 further provides:
If agreement [on surface damages] is not reached, or if the operator
is not able to contact all parties, the operator shall petition the
district court in the county in which the drilling site is located for
appointment of appraisers to make recommendations to the parties
and to the court concerning the amount of damages, if any. Once
the operator has petitioned for appointment of appraisers he may
enter the site to drill.8"
The two words, "if any," relating to recommendations concerning the amount
of surface damages, raise the most intriguing question as to the overall intent
of the Act. These two words raise the question as to what damages the
legislature intended should be recoverable because it is unimaginable that there
could be drilling without any surface damages. Could they mean that the
legislature intended to retain the common law doctrine permitting the mineral
owner reasonable surface use and that damages are recoverable only to the
extent surface use is unreasonable? If so, the Act is but a codification of
the common law. These two words should at least raise questions as to what
damages are recoverable under the Act.
Notice of intent to drill, negotiations as to surface damages, and petitioning
the court for appraisement of damages can cause delays in commencement
of drilling. Because time is money in the oil and gas business, operators should
be interested in streamlining these procedural requirements. Therefore, the
operator would be wise to have standard forms for notice of intent to drill
and petition for appraisal of damages prepared by an attorney.
The remaining procedural provisions of the Act are summarized. Subsection
84. Id. § 4 at 1063 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5 (Supp. 1982)).
85. Id. § 4 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5 (Supp. 1982)).
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B of section 4 requires that ten days' notice of the petition to appoint ap-
praisers be given to all opposing parties. Provision is made for notice by
publication when the whereabouts of the opposing parties cannot be ascertained
with reasonable diligence.
Subsection C of section 4 provides that, after proper petition and notice,
the operator and the surface owner shall each select one appraiser. The two
appraisers so selected shall select a third appraiser for appointment by the
court. In case either party fails initially to select an appraiser, or if the two
selected appraisers cannot agree on the third appraiser, the remaining required
appraiser shall be selected by the court. Once the appraisers have been duly
appointed and sworn by the court, they are to inspect the property to assess
the surface damages the surface owner has or will sustain from the proposed
well. The prudent operator should line up an appraiser in each county where
drilling is anticipated, although appointment of appraisers does not serve to
delay commencement of drilling.
The appraisers shall file a written report of their findings with the court
clerk within fifteen days from the date of their appointment. Upon such filing
the court will set compensation for the appraisers, this cost to be divided
equally between the operator and the surface owner. Subsection D of section
4 provides that within ten days after the filing of the appraisers' report, the
court clerk shall send to each party a copy and a notice stating the time limits
for filing exceptions or demand for jury trial. Subsection F of section 4 provides
that all exceptions to the appraisers' report must be filed within thirty days
after the filing of the report. In addition, either party may within sixty days
of the filing of such report file a written demand for a trial by jury, in which
case damages will be assessed by jury. However, if the party demanding trial
by jury fails to receive a verdict more favorable to him than the appraisers'
assessment, all court costs, including reasonable attorney fees, shall be assessed
against him.
Section 5 of the Act provides the procedure for appeal of the court's decision
on any exceptions to the appraisers' report or from the jury verdict. 6 Any
appeal shall not serve to delay drilling operations provided the award of the
appraisers or jury has been deposited with the court clerk for the use and
benefit of the surface owner.
Conclusion
In evaluating the Act there are two important factors to Lconsider. The first
factor involves the legitimacy of the Act's purpose. The Act, like the common
law, is a legal solution to an unanticipated problem arising between two parties
vying for economic advantage. However, the Act changes the economic con-
sequences of the legal solution. The propriety of the change by legislative
intervention can be challenged on several grounds.
At the root of the problem are the competing interests of the surface owner
86. Id. § 5 at 1065 (codified as 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5 (Supp. 1982)).
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and the mineral owner, and who, in the absence of express provision, should
bear the costs of surface damage. The common law approach assumed that
the consideration for the mineral conveyance, absent express contrary provi-
sion, included compensation for the right to surface use. The rationale was
that the surface owner intended the mineral owner to be able to locate and
remove the minerals. The wisdom of the common law was that the surface
owner was free to bargain specifically for surface damages. If he failed to
do so, the court would not allow the existence of the anomolous situation
of a right without substance, an interest without a means to enjoy it. By tak-
ing this approach the common law recognized the realities of the economic
bargain.
The Oklahoma legislature discarded the wisdom of the common law. The
Act, while still allowing independent bargaining as to surface damages, rejects
the realities of the economic bargain when the parties do not specifically
provide for surface damages. The Act allows a mineral interest to be purchased
for value but denies the corresponding right to enjoy this interest without
paying additional consideration.
The most persuasive argument in support of the Act is that it will serve
to protect the naive surface owner from striking a bad economic bargain.
If this is truly the case, why did the legislature seek only to protect surface
owners against implied easements in the oil and gas context? The Act leaves
intact the common law approach in other situations. For instance, a purchaser
of a surface interest that is completely landlocked by the seller's land will
still receive an implied easement for ingress and egress. Are such sellers not
equally deserving of protection from their lack of foresight to specifically
provide for surface damages? Inescapably, the Act is an attempt to protect
a select group of surface owners from making bad economic bargains. Such
protection is an invasion of private commercial transactions under the guise
of protecting the public interest.
The second factor in evaluating the Act involves its effectiveness in ac-
complishing the desired objective. Is the Act effective in protecting surface
owners from bad economic bargains? This in part depends on whether the
Act will be given retroactive application. Because a vast number of mineral
interests were severed prior to the Act, its effectiveness in protecting those
surface owners depends on the retroactive application of the Act.
Yet, the retroactive application of the Act should be seriously questioned.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated: "It is the rule of statutory con-
struction that all statutes are to be construed as having a prospective operation
unless the purposes and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospec-
tive effect is expressly declared.'17 The court further stated: "In every case
of doubt the doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect."I8 Since
the Act does not make clear any intention of retroactive effect, it should be
87. Good v. Keel, 29 Okla. 325, 116 P. 777 (1911), cited in State v. Board of Educ. of
Indep. School Dist. No. 74, 206 Okla. 699, 703, 246 P.2d 368, 372 (1952).
88. Id., 116 P. at 777.
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